Rule Knowledge Aids Performance on Spatial and Object Alternation Tasks by Alcoholic Patients with and Without Korsakoff's Amnesia by Bardenhagen, Fiona J. et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Department of Neurology MED: Neurology Scholarly Works
2007
Rule Knowledge Aids Performance
on Spatial and Object Alternation
Tasks by Alcoholic Patients with
and Without Korsakoff's Amnesia
Bardenhagen, Fiona J., Marlene Oscar-Berman, Stephen C. Bowden. "Rule
knowledge aids performance on spatial and object alternation tasks by alcoholic
patients with and without Korsakoff's amnesia" Neuropsychiatric Disease and
Treatment 3(6): 907-918. (2007)
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/3177
Boston University
© 2007 Dove Medical Press Limited.  All rights reserved
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2007:3(6) 907–918 907
O R I G I N A L  R E S E A R C H
Rule knowledge aids performance on spatial 
and object alternation tasks by alcoholic patients 
with and without Korsakoff ’s amnesia
Fiona J Bardenhagen1,2
Marlene Oscar-Berman3
Stephen C Bowden2,4
1School of Psychology, Victoria 
University, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia; 2Clinical Neurosciences, 
St. Vincent’s Hospital, Melbourne, 
Australia; 3Division of Psychiatry 
and Departments of Neurology and 
Anatomy and Neurobiology, Boston 
University School of Medicine; and 
Psychology Research Service, 
US Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) Healthcare System, Jamaica 
Plain Campus, MA, USA; 4School 
of Behavioural Science, University 
of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, 
Australia
Correspondence: Fiona J Bardenhagen
Melbourne City MC, Victoria 8001, 
Australia
Tel +61 3 9919 2778
Fax +61 3 9288 3551
Email fi ona.bardenhagen@vu.edu.au
Abstract: Delayed alternation (DA) and object alternation (OA) tasks traditionally have been 
used to measure defective response inhibition associated with dysfunction of frontal brain 
systems. However, these tasks are also sensitive to nonfrontal lesions, and cognitive processes 
such as the induction of rule-learning strategies also are needed in order to perform well on 
these tasks. Performance on DA and OA tasks was explored in 10 patients with alcohol-induced 
persisting amnestic disorder (Korsakoff’s syndrome), 11 abstinent long-term alcoholics, and 
13 healthy non-alcoholic controls under each of two rule provision conditions: Alternation Rule 
and Correction Rule. Results confi rmed that rule knowledge is a crucial cognitive component 
for solving problems such as DA and OA, and therefore, that errors on these tasks are not due to 
defective response inhibition alone. Further, rule-induction strategies were helpful to Korsakoff 
patients, despite their poorer performance on the tasks. These results stress the role of multiple 
cognitive abilities in successful performance on rule induction tasks. Evidence that these cog-
nitive abilities are served by diffusely distributed neural networks should be considered when 
interpreting behavioral impairments on these tasks.
Keywords: alcoholism, Korsakoff’s syndrome, comparative neuropsychology, perseveration, 
rule induction, working memory
Introduction
The use of experimental tasks adopted from nonhuman animal models to study 
cognitive functions in humans has been termed “comparative neuropsychology” 
(Oscar-Berman 2004). Delayed Alternation (DA) and Object Alternation (OA), two 
commonly used tests of frontal lobe function in monkeys, have been used as measures 
of prefrontal system dysfunction in a wide variety of human clinical populations 
(for review, see Oscar-Berman and Bardenhagen 1998). Poor performances on these 
comparative neuropsychological tasks are traditionally interpreted to refl ect impaired 
behavioral inhibition, or an inability to suppress prepotent responses such as a pre-
viously correct response, and are attributed to prefrontal dysfunction (Pribram and 
Mishkin 1956; Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998; Freedman et al 1998; Oscar-Berman 
et al 2004). However, in addition to the ability to inhibit incorrect responding, both 
tasks require participants to deduce response rules in the absence of explicit cues 
(Verin et al 1993).
Rule induction is a complex ability that is especially important for solving tests of 
prefrontal function (Wang 1987). Induction of task rules involves the ability to engage 
in conceptual change, or to test hypotheses (Hauser 1999). The ability to test and 
discard hypotheses, shown to be necessary for successful performance on OA – and 
presumably DA – tasks (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998), is thought to involve 
prefrontal working memory (eg, Goldman-Rakic 1987). Prefrontal working memory 
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regulates behavior through the manipulation of sensory and 
mnemonic representations of experience, as well as symbolic 
representations such as concepts or plans, which have been 
elaborated in other cerebral networks (Goldman-Rakic 1987; 
1991). The integrity of working memory depends on the 
transmission of sensory information, conceptual knowledge, 
and stored schemas from other cortical areas to the prefrontal 
cortex (Fuster 1997; Goldman-Rakic 1987; Fuster 2006). 
For example, there is evidence that the ability to maintain 
hypotheses in the face of distraction or disconfi rmation may 
depend on limbic structures (Pribram et al 1969).
In a study of the cognitive components required for learn-
ing OA, neurologically intact individuals, as well as recently 
detoxifi ed alcoholics, were found to make a large number of 
errors unrelated to abnormal inhibitory control (Bardenhagen 
and Bowden 1998). Consistent with models of prefrontal 
working memory (Goldman-Rakic 1987; Fuster 2006), this 
fi nding indicated that poor performances on OA and DA 
tasks are due to factors more complex than impaired response 
inhibition, and results suggested that rule induction must be 
achieved before successful response selection and inhibition 
can occur (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998).
Clarifi cation of the abilities needed for success on DA 
and OA tasks is important because these tests have been 
widely used to assess brain function in a variety of neu-
rological and psychiatric conditions (Oscar-Berman and 
Bardenhagen 1998). Some researchers have argued that 
impairments in working memory are responsible for errors 
on tasks of prefrontal functioning (eg, Goldman-Rakic 1991; 
Kimberg et al 1997). DA is considered a measure of spatial 
working memory (Goldman-Rakic 1987), and performance 
on the task is severely disrupted following bilateral lesions 
of the lateral surface of the frontal lobes (Pribram and 
Mishkin 1956; Mishkin et al 1969; Freedman and Oscar-
Berman 1986). Additionally, in a study of six individuals 
with bilateral frontal lobe lesions, DA was sensitive to 
medial frontal lesions, and possibly orbitofrontal lesions as 
well (Freedman et al 1998). As a result, DA impairments 
have been interpreted as evidence of prefrontal dysfunction 
in a wide range of conditions such as closed head injury, 
Alzheimer’s disease, Korsakoff’s syndrome, depression, and 
schizophrenia (Oscar-Berman et al 1982; Freedman 1990, 
1994; Seidman et al 1995; Gansler et al 1996). In contrast to 
DA’s role as a task of spatial working memory, OA is said 
to be a measure of visual working memory, and is sensitive 
to orbitofrontal and medial frontal damage (Pribram and 
Mishkin 1956; Freedman et al 1998). Human experiments 
have revealed OA impairments in patients with bilateral 
frontal lobe damage, closed head injury, Parkinson’s disease 
(both with and without dementia), Alzheimer’s disease, and 
schizophrenia, while no impairments were found in groups of 
depressed or non-amnestic alcoholic individuals (Freedman 
and Oscar-Berman 1986; Freedman 1990, 1994; Seidman 
et al 1995; Gansler et al 1996).
Although the sensitivity of DA and OA tasks to prefrontal 
lesions is well known, few researchers have considered the 
sensitivity of DA and OA to limbic system lesions. DA is 
sensitive to lesions of the amygdala and hippocampus in 
monkeys and rats (Orbach et al 1960; Waxler and Rosvold 
1970; Mahut 1971; Winocur 1985). DA is sensitive to lesions 
of the mammillary bodies and the dorsomedial nucleus of the 
thalamus in rats, cats, and monkeys (Irle and Markowitsch 
1982; Isseroff et al 1982). Human studies using DA have 
also shown that it is not always sensitive or specifi c to frontal 
lesions. For example, one study found no difference between 
patients with unilateral frontal lobe lesions and non-frontal 
lesions (Chorover and Cole 1966). Another study found no 
group differences between controls and patients with frontal 
or temporal lesions or Parkinson’s disease (Canavan et al 
1969). A third study reported that patients with dorsolateral 
prefrontal lesions performed better than controls and patients 
with postcentral lesions (Verin et al 1993). While negative 
fi ndings may be a function of procedural variations, it is 
clear from this research that lesions in locations other than 
the prefrontal cortex affects DA performance. This infer-
ence is compatible with brain models postulating widely 
distributed working memory networks (eg, Goldman-Rakic 
1991; Fuster 1997; Fox et al 2005; Fuster 2006). In light of 
the evidence of limbic involvement in DA performance, the 
DA impairments reported in conditions such as closed head 
injury, Alzheimer’s disease, depression, and schizophrenia 
(Oscar-Berman et al 1982; Freedman 1990, 1994; Seidman 
et al 1995; Gansler et al 1996) may be related to limbic 
involvement (Wright et al 2000). Similarly, DA impairments 
in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome may be tied to limbic 
and diencephalic neuropathology (Bengochea and Gonzalo 
1990; Jernigan et al 1991; Harper et al 1995).
Unlike DA, OA has not been used widely to test nonhuman 
animals with focal lesions of regions other than the prefrontal 
cortex. In the one study that examined OA performance in 
monkeys with lesions outside the frontal lobes, the authors 
reported that lesions of inferotemporal cortex resulted in no 
impairment (Pribram and Mishkin 1956). However, recent 
positron emission tomography (PET) studies demonstrated 
activations in several non-frontal regions during performance 
of both DA and OA tasks, suggesting that areas beyond 
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prefrontal cortex are involved in performance on these 
tasks (Zald et al 2002, 2005). These fi ndings are consistent 
with prefrontal working memory models (Goldman-Rakic 
1991; Fuster 1997, 2006), in that tests of prefrontal function 
require activation of a number of cortical areas. The fi ndings 
of nonfrontal activations may also explain the DA and OA 
impairments observed in conditions such as Parkinson’s 
disease, where lesions in the basal ganglia interfere with the 
transmittal of information to the prefrontal cortex.
In terms of analysis of DA and OA task performance, a 
main focus in the literature to date has been on interpreting 
total error scores and perseverative errors. As noted earlier, 
poor performance – commission of perseverative errors in 
particular – has typically been attributed to impaired response 
inhibition caused by prefrontal lesions (eg, Freedman et al 
1998). However, in general terms, abnormal perseverative 
behavior is not specifi cally attributable to frontal lesions 
alone (Sandson and Albert 1984). For example, an inability 
to engage in the conceptual change necessary to induce rules 
may result in repeated errors or “paradigmatic persevera-
tion” (Hauser 1999). Hauser noted that while “perseverative 
actions are often the result of inhibitory problems… inhibi-
tory problems do not always lead to perseverative actions” 
(Hauser 1999, p 214). Hauser demonstrated the importance of 
task-relevant knowledge in reducing paradigmatic persevera-
tion in a series of experiments where provision of contextual 
information often assisted monkeys in inhibiting preferred 
responses. Similarly, a reduction in both perseverative and 
nonperseverative errors with provision of the OA response 
rules indicates that the ability to induce rules is a key com-
ponent of the task (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998).
The primary aim of the present study was to determine if 
rule provision improves DA and OA performance in patients 
with alcohol-induced persisting amnestic disorder (Korsa-
koff’s syndrome; KS), as previously had been shown in 
healthy controls and non-Korsakoff alcoholics. We reasoned 
that if rule provision improves performance by KS patients, 
it would support existing evidence of cognitive defi cits in 
this population that extend beyond an inability to inhibit 
perseverative responses (Oscar-Berman and Evert 1997). We 
chose to study the role of rule learning in DA and OA tasks in 
this group, because KS patients are known to have diffi culty 
in the performance of such problems (Oscar-Berman et al 
1982; Dirksen et al 2006). Given the similarities between DA 
and OA tasks, and the classic association between abnormal 
inhibitory control (response perseveration) and KS (Oscar-
Berman et al 1982), we hypothesized that if impairments in 
rule induction are largely responsible for poor performance 
on these tasks (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998; Dirksen 
et al 2006), then provision of the response rules should 
reduce the number of trials to criterion and the number of 
perseverative and nonperseverative errors in amnesic and 
nonamnesic participants alike. However, if errors made by 
KS patients are due to defective response inhibition rather 
than to a failure to induce task rules, then rule provision 
should not improve their performance. In either case, results 
have direct relevance for describing the nature of cognitive 
defi cits in alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome.
Method
Participants
A total of 34 right-handed individuals participated in the 
study. The fi rst group consisted of 10 KS men who met 
the DSM-IV criteria for diagnosis of alcohol-induced per-
sisting amnestic disorder (American Psychiatric Association 
1994). All had a history of chronic alcohol dependence, and 
showed clinically signifi cant memory impairments. The 
second group consisted of 11 abstinent previously long-term 
alcohol-dependent people (AL), and the third group was 
comprised of 13 healthy community controls without a his-
tory of alcohol dependence (NC). These last two groups were 
recruited as part of a larger study investigating the effects of 
alcohol and aging on cognitive functioning (Oscar-Berman 
et al 2004; Dirksen et al 2006).
Several questionnaires (eg, handedness, alcohol and drug 
use), tests, and interviews were administered to all partici-
pants in order to ensure that they met the inclusion criteria for 
the study (see below). As part of this assessment, all partici-
pants were given sections of a computerized version of the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) (Robins et al 1989) that 
provides lifetime psychiatric diagnoses according to DSM-
III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association 1987). These 
subsections included: generalized anxiety, depression, mania, 
schizophrenia, alcohol abuse and dependence, drug abuse and 
dependence, and organic brain syndrome. A vision test was 
also administered at the time of testing. The demographic and 
medical history information was obtained from participants’ 
self-reports and medical records when available. 
The inclusion criteria for all participants in the study 
included the following: normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and hearing; no history of neurological dysfunction 
(eg, stroke, signifi cant head trauma, loss of consciousness 
for longer than 15 min, or epilepsy); no history of learning 
disabilities, dyslexia, or attention defi cit disorders; no major 
medical illness (eg, signifi cant diabetes, liver disease, and 
heart disease); no history of polydrug abuse, extensive or 
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recent illicit drug use; no major psychiatric disorders; not 
currently on antidepressants or anti-anxiety medications; 
and no history of electroconvulsive therapy.
Criteria for classifying someone as an alcoholic vary (Abel 
et al 1999; Oscar-Berman and Marinkovic 2007). A minimum 
criterion of at least fi ve years of drinking 21 or more drinks 
per week (one drink = 50 ml beer, 148 ml wine, or 44 ml hard 
liquor) is common among studies assessing alcohol-related 
cognitive decline (eg, Oscar-Berman et al 2004). It is important 
to note, however, that problem-based criteria, not quantity and 
frequency of consumption, comprise a defi nition for alcohol 
use disorders (Oscar-Berman and Marinkovic 2007). In the 
present study, the AL group met the following criteria: a 
minimum of fi ve years of drinking at least 21 drinks per week; 
a sobriety period of at least one month so as not to confound 
acute alcohol effects with the long-term residual effects of 
alcohol dependence; and a positive diagnosis of alcohol abuse 
and dependence according to DSM-III-R criteria, determined 
by administering the Alcohol Abuse and Dependence subsec-
tion of the DIS. None of the control participants had a positive 
diagnosis on this measure.
Members of the AL group drank 21 or more drinks per 
week for an average of 19.78 years (SD = 9.94), and were 
sober for an average of 10.8 years (SD = 6.66) (see Table 1). 
A Quantity-Frequency Index (QFI), which takes into consid-
eration the amount, type, and frequency of use of alcoholic 
beverages either over the last six months (for the NC group), 
or over the six months preceding cessation of drinking (for the 
AL group), was calculated for each participant (Cahalan et al 
1969). The average QFI for the AL group was 8.02 (SD = 5.57; 
range = 0.23 to 20.35), and 0.18 for the NC group (SD = 0.23; 
range = 0 to 0.72), a difference that was statistically signifi cant, 
t(22) = 5.09, p < 0.001. Demographic details for the three 
groups are presented in Table 1. The research was approved 
by the Institutional Review Boards of the participating institu-
tions, and informed consent was obtained from participants or 
their representatives (for KS patients). The participants were 
compensated for their time and travel expenses.
Apparatus
A Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus (WGTA), 
described previously (Freedman 1990), was used for testing 
on DA and OA (see Figure 1). The WGTA consisted of a 
wooden stimulus board attached to a wooden frame from 
which an opaque screen was suspended. The participant and 
the experimenter sat facing each other across a table with the 
WGTA between them. The experimenter raised the screen 
to reveal the stimulus board to the participant during testing. 
Circular stimulus wells (8 cm diameter, 1 cm deep) were cut 
into the board, with the midpoints of each well placed half 
way between the front and back of the board. The centers of 
the wells were approximately 24 cm apart. For DA testing, 
identical square wooden plaques covered the wells. In OA, 
a three-dimensional stimulus object (eg, a small toy) was 
mounted on each plaque. The stimulus wells were padded 
with felt cloth to minimize any auditory cues during the 
preparation of each trial. The participant could see neither 
the wells nor the experimenter when the screen was down. 
When the screen was raised, the participant could see the 
stimulus board, the plaques (and objects in OA), and the 
experimenter’s hands, but not the experimenter’s face.
Design and procedure
In DA, participants have to fi nd a reward under one of two 
identical stimulus plaques. To do this they must determine 
that the reward is alternated between left and right positions 
on successive trials (Alternation Rule), but that if they choose 
the wrong (unrewarded) side on a trial, the reward remains 
on the same side until it is retrieved (Correction Rule). In 
OA, participants have to fi nd a reward under one of two 
objects, the location of which randomly alternates between 
left and right positions. To fi nd the reward, participants must 
determine that the reward alternates between the objects on 
successive trials (Alternation Rule), but that if they choose 
the wrong (unrewarded) object on a trial, the reward remains 
with the same object until it is retrieved (Correction Rule). 
Table 1 Participant characteristics
  Korsakoff (KS) Alcoholics (AL) Controls (NC)
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age        
(years)  70.50 (9.14) 60.36 (8.12) 63.9 (28.56)
Range  50–81  50–77  50–79
Education
(years)  11.80 (1.75) 15.00 (1.73) 16.15 (1.14)
Gender 10M; 0F  6M; 5F  6M; 7F
WAIS-R VIQ 95.13 (15.25) 110.45 (16.04) 117.85 (13.71)
WMS-R GMI 83.67 (12.66) 114.82 (14.94) 113.46 (13.95)
WMS-R DRI 61.20 (10.99) 110.36 (17.18) 110.92 (13.67)
QFI   *  8.02 (5.57) 0.18 (0.23)
LOS (years) *  10.80 (6.66) ** 
Years 21 plus *  19.78 (9.94) ** 
Notes: *drinking history and sobriety data were not available for KS group 
because these measures require recall of alcohol consumption. ** These data were 
not relevant for the NC group because they had no history of alcoholism.
Abbreviations: WAIS-R VIQ, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, Verbal IQ 
(Wechsler 1981); WMS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Wechsler 1987); GMI, 
General Memory Index; DRI, Delayed Recall Index; QFI, Quantity-Frequency Index 
of alcohol consumption (Cahalan et al 1969); LOS, Length of sobriety; Years 21 plus, 
years of drinking more than 21 drinks per week.
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In DA and OA, perseverative errors are said to occur when 
the participant repeatedly chooses the incorrect stimulus 
within one trial (Freedman 1990). A nonperseverative error 
is defi ned as a single error on a trial (Freedman 1990). In 
each task there is a learning criterion (12 consecutive correct 
responses) and a failure criterion for discontinuation (a maxi-
mum of 50 trials without meeting the learning criterion).
The design of the experiment was based on that described 
previously (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998). Participants in 
each group were randomly assigned to one of four-rule provi-
sion conditions for both DA and OA. The four rule-provision 
conditions were: (1) Both Rules were explained (Both Rules); 
(2) the Alternation Rule only was explained (AR only); (3) the 
Correction Rule only was explained (CR only); and (4) neither 
rule was explained (No Rules; the standard form of the task). 
Thus, a minimum of fi ve subjects in each group were provided 
with rules, and a minimum of four subjects per group were 
not provided with rules (see Tables 2 and 3). This distribu-
tion allowed at least two participants from each group (KS, 
AL, NC) to be included in each of the specifi c rule provision 
conditions, and power analysis from our previous research 
(Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998) suggested that a minimum 
of two subjects per group would be needed in each condi-
tion in order to obtain signifi cant effects of rule provision. 
DA and OA test order was counterbalanced, and separated 
by an interval of 15 to 20 minutes duration fi lled with other 
unrelated psychological testing. A three-way factorial design 
was used with three between-subjects factors: Group (KS, AL, 
NC); Alternation Rule (provided or not); and Correction Rule 
(provided or not). Our previous research (Bardenhagen and 
Bowden 1998) has shown that these rule manipulations may 
have different effects on the various scores. On the basis of 
Figure 1 A modifi ed Wisconsin General Test Apparatus (WGTA). The WGTA consisted of a wooden frame approximately 54 cm wide and 65 cm high.  An opaque curtain 
was anchored to the top of the frame in such a way that it could be raised by the experimenter to reveal a stimulus board (53 x 28 cm) containing two circular reinforce-
ment wells 8 cm in diameter and 1 cm deep. The reinforcement wells were covered with felt cloth to eliminate auditory cues associated with coin placement and the prepa-
ration of each trial. The reinforcement wells were 24 cm apart from center to center, and for DA tasks, the wells were covered by identical black square stimulus plaques 
(7.6 x 7.6 x 0.5 cm). For OA tasks, a three-dimensional stimulus object (eg, a small toy) was mounted on each plaque; each of the objects had different shapes and colors. 
When the curtain was in the lowered position, the participant could see neither the stimuli nor the investigator.  When the curtain was raised for each trial, the participant 
could see the stimuli and the hands of the investigator, but not the investigator’s face.
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our previous data, the Correction Rule was expected to reduce 
perseverative errors but not nonperseverative errors or trials to 
criterion, while the Alternation Rule was expected to reduce 
trials to criterion and both perseverative and nonperseverative 
errors on DA and OA.
DA and OA were administered in the manner described 
previously (Freedman and Oscar-Berman 1986; Bardenhagen 
and Bowden 1998). Depending on the task, participants were 
told they would see two stimuli (three-dimensional objects in 
OA, or identical square black plaques in DA), and that there 
would always be a penny under one of the stimuli. The aim 
of the task was to try to fi nd the penny every time the screen 
was raised. Participants were told they would actually earn 
fi ve cents for every penny they collected. Instructions varied 
according to the rule provision conditions. Participants in the 
Both Rules and Alternation Rule Only conditions were told 
the Alternation Rule in addition to the standard instructions. 
They were told the coin would alternate between the two 
squares (DA) or two objects (OA) on successive trials. Partici-
pants in the Both Rules and Correction Rule Only conditions 
were informed that if they chose the stimulus without the coin 
on one trial, the coin would remain with the other object or 
on the other side until they retrieved it. Therefore, if they 
chose a stimulus without a coin under it, they should choose 
the other stimulus when the screen was raised again. In order 
to ensure that performance was not affected by participants 
forgetting the rules, those who were provided with either or 
both response rules were reminded of the rules during testing 
if they broke the rules with which they had been provided, 
but the number of reminders was not recorded.
For the fi rst trial of each task, a coin was placed under 
each stimulus, and the trial began when the experimenter 
raised the screen. The screen was lowered after the participant 
removed a coin from one of the two stimulus wells. The 
stimuli were removed from both wells and replaced after 
one coin was placed in a well. After each correct response, 
including the fi rst one, the position of the coin was alternated 
between left and right sides for DA, and between objects for 
OA. In OA, the objects were alternated between left and right 
positions on a modifi ed random schedule (Gellermann 1933). 
When an incorrect choice was made, the coin remained with 
the same object in OA and in the same position for both DA 
and OA while the screen was down for 10 seconds. The trial 
was completed when the correct side was chosen. There was 
a 10-second intertrial interval, the learning criterion was 
12 consecutive correct responses, and the failure criterion 
was 50 trials. The duration of each DA and OA test session 
depended on the number of trials completed by each partici-
pant. As each trial was separated by an intertrial interval of 
10 seconds, the minimum time for completing either task in 
12 trials was 120 seconds plus the response time for each of 
the 12 items; the maximum time for the 50 trials was 500 
seconds plus the response time for each of the 50 items; 
additional time was needed for commission of perseverative 
responses. Although the testing times for each subject were 
not recorded, common response times were in the range of 
2 to 10 seconds, and the duration of the DA or OA test ses-
sion ranged from approximately 2.5 minutes for error-free 
performance over 12 trials, to approximately 15 minutes for 
participants reaching the failure criterion of 50 trials.
Results
The AL and NC groups were equivalent in age, education, 
and Verbal IQ (VIQ; Wechsler 1981; Table 1), but the 
Table 2 Results of ANCOVAs on DA trials to criterion, nonperseverative errors, and perseverative errors
DA Alternation Rule Correction Rule Group
 (Provided to n = 5 KS, 6 AL, 7 NC (Provided to n= 5 KS, 5 AL, 6 NC N = 9 KS, 11 AL, and 13 NC
 Not provided to n = 4 KS, 5 AL, 6 NC) Not provided to n = 4 KS, 6 AL, 7 NC) 
Trials to criterion F(1, 19) = 7.99, p  0.02, η2 = 0.296 F(1, 19) = 8.87, p  0.01, η2 = .318 F(2, 19) = 3.68, p  0.05, η2 = 0.279
Nonperseverative errors F(1, 19) = 7.27, p  0.02, η2 = 0.277 F(1, 19) = 1.35, p  0.05, η2 = .066 F(2, 19) = 0.85, p  0.05, η2 = 0.082
Perseverative errors F(1, 19) = 5.88, p  0.03, η2 = 0.236 F(1, 19) = 0.35, p  0.05, η2 = .018 F(2, 19) = 0.21, p  0.05, η2 = 0.021
Table 3 Results of ANCOVAs on OA trials to criterion, nonperseverative errors, and perseverative errors
OA Alternation Rule Correction Rule Group
 (Provided to n = 6 KS, 6 AL, 7 NC (Provided to n = 6 KS, 5 AL, 6 NC N = 10 KS, 11 AL, and 13 NC
 Not provided to n = 4 KS, 5 AL, 6 NC) Not provided to n = 4 KS, 6 AL, 7 NC) 
Trials to criterion F(1, 20) = 25.71, p  0.001, η2 = 0.562 F(1, 20) = 6.52, p  0.02, η2 = 0.246 F(2, 20) = 1.14, p  0.05, η2 = 0.102.
Nonperseverative errors F(1, 20) = 41.39, p  0.001, η2 = 0.674 F(1, 20) = 11.41, p  0.005, η2 = 0.363 F(2, 20) = 2.02, p  0.05, η2 = 0.168
Perseverative errors F(1, 20) = 6.82, p  0.02, η2 = 0.254 F(1, 20) = 0.00, p  0.05, η2 = 0.000 F(2, 20) = 0.63, p  0.05, η2 = 0.059
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KS participants were signifi cantly older F(2, 31) = 3.73, 
p  0.05, less educated F(2, 31) = 23.52, p  0.001, and 
had lower VIQs F(2, 27) = 5.77, p  0.01. Age, education, 
and VIQ were, therefore, used as covariates in analyses of 
the data. Performances of the three groups on DA trials to 
criterion, nonperseverative errors, and perseverative errors 
were examined using three separate general linear model 
(GLM) univariate Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA; SPSS 
version 10.0), each having three between-subjects factors 
(Group, Alternation Rule, Correction Rule) and three covari-
ates (Age, Education, VIQ). There were three levels for the 
between-subjects factor of Group (NC, AL, KS), and two 
levels for each of the rule provision conditions (rule provided 
or not provided). These analyses were repeated for scores 
on OA. Although the data were positively skewed, analyses 
of transformed data did not change the pattern of results, 
nor did nonparametric analyses, so parametric analyses of 
untransformed data are reported. The effects of the covariates 
(age, education, and VIQ) were nonsignifi cant for all DA and 
OA measures (all ps > 0.05). Counterbalancing of test order 
in the experimental design resulted in no signifi cant effects 
of order of presentation on performance (all ps > 0.05). Par-
tial eta-squared (η2) effect sizes are reported for the 3-way 
factorial model used for the analyses. Effect size estimates 
were evaluated according to Cohen’s criteria, with a small 
f (0.10) corresponding to η2 = 0.0099, a medium f (0.25) cor-
responding to η2 = 0.0588, and a large f (0.40) corresponding 
to η2 = 0.1379 (Cohen 1988). In the KS group, one of the 10 
subjects did not complete the DA test.
Delayed alternation
Results for the three groups in the four DA rule provision 
conditions are presented in Figure 2. Table 2 shows that, as 
hypothesized, provision of the Alternation Rule had signifi -
cant effects on trials to criterion, nonperseverative errors, and 
perseverative errors. Contrary to expectations based on our 
previous research (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998), instruc-
tion in the Correction Rule only had a signifi cant effect on 
DA trials to criterion, but not on nonperseverative and per-
severative errors, where effect sizes were medium and small, 
respectively. The three Groups differed signifi cantly on DA 
trials to criterion, but not on nonperseverative or persevera-
tive errors, where medium to large, and small to medium 
Group effects were found, respectively. Planned simple 
contrasts showed that the KS group required signifi cantly 
more trials than either the AL or NC groups. There were no 
signifi cant interactions involving Group, Alternation Rule, 
or Correction Rule on any of the DA measures.
Object alternation
Results for OA trials to criterion, nonperseverative errors, 
and perseverative errors are presented in Figure 3. Statistical 
analyses, reported in Table 3, show the expected signifi cant 
effects of Alternation Rule provision on trials to criterion, 
nonperseverative errors, and perseverative errors. Correc-
tion Rule provision resulted in signifi cant effects on trials 
to criterion and, unexpectedly, on nonperseverative but not 
perseverative errors, where the effect size was negligible. 
There were no signifi cant Group effects on any of the OA 
measures, but the effect sizes were medium to large for trials 
to criterion, large for nonperseverative errors, and medium 
for perseverative errors. All two-way interactions on OA 
performance were nonsignifi cant.
There was a signifi cant three-way interaction of Group × 
Alternation Rule × Correction Rule for OA nonperseverative 
errors, F(2, 20) = 4.85, p < 0.02, η2 = 0.327. Examination of 
this interaction (Figure 4) indicated that while provision of 
either the Alternation or Correction Rule alone was enough 
to reduce or eliminate nonperseverative errors in the AL 
and NC groups, the KS group did not benefi t greatly from 
instruction in the Correction Rule alone, showed substantial 
variability in performance when given the Alternation Rule 
alone (visible in the error bars in Figure 4), and performed 
best when both rules were provided.
Discussion
As predicted, provision of the response rules aided DA and 
OA performance for all three groups, confi rming that rule 
knowledge is a fundamental requirement for success on these 
tasks (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998), and, importantly, 
that rule knowledge improves performance in KS patients, 
despite documented problems with impaired response inhibi-
tion in this group (eg, Oscar-Berman et al 1982). Provision 
of the Alternation Rule had the expected signifi cant effects 
on all aspects of DA and OA performance for all groups. 
Instruction in the Correction Rule had signifi cant effects on 
trials to criterion for both tasks, and on OA nonpersevera-
tive errors, while the effect on DA nonperseverative errors 
was medium in size. In contrast, provision of the Correction 
Rule did not signifi cantly reduce OA nonperseverative errors 
in our previous research, but did reduce OA perseverative 
errors (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998). In the current study, 
perseverative errors on DA and OA were not signifi cantly 
affected by provision of the Correction Rule, with small and 
negligible effect sizes, respectively. Sampling differences 
may account for this discrepancy in results, as the proce-
dures were identical. A larger sample size in our previous 
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research may have helped detect an effect of Correction 
Rule provision on OA perseverative errors. In any case, it 
seems reasonable to speculate that provision of the Correc-
tion Rule may have reduced DA and OA trials to criterion 
and OA nonperseverative errors in this study by removing 
the cognitive demand of having another rule to induce in 
the tasks. In addition, in all three groups, provision of the 
Alternation Rule signifi cantly reduced perseverative errors, 
presumably because it also reduced the number of nonper-
severative errors, and hence the number of opportunities to 
make perseverative errors.
The low number of perseverative errors made by the 
KS group overall, even in the No Rules condition, was an 
interesting fi nding, given the classic association of abnormal 
perseveration with Korsakoff’s amnesia (Oscar-Berman 
et al 1982). It suggests that impaired response inhibition 
was not the predominant problem for the KS patients in this 
study. However, given the small-to-medium and medium 
effect sizes for Group on DA and OA perseverative errors, 
respectively, larger sample sizes would have resulted in the 
expected impairments in the KS group. Of note, a low num-
ber of perseverative errors in the KS group is not unusual, 
because with repetition, patients with Korsakoff’s amnesia 
are capable of retaining limited information, and low – but 
abnormal – error scores have been reported elsewhere in the 
literature (eg, Dirksen et al 2006 and Oscar-Berman et al 
2004). Although the perseverative error data were skewed, 
analyses of transformed data and the use of nonparametric 
tests did not change the pattern of results. While persevera-
tive errors are a feature of DA and OA performance, even 
in healthy controls, similar fl oor effects are present for 
perseverative errors in all the literature using these tests, 
and are diffi cult to eradicate, except by making the tasks 
more diffi cult and errors more frequent. In future research 
it may be interesting to test the role of rule provision after 
development of a pre-potent response in a reversal paradigm 
in a KS group.
The signifi cant three-way interaction on OA nonper-
severative errors demonstrated that KS patients benefi ted 
most from provision of both rules on this measure. While 
this observation is plausible, it is not clear why this result 
was found only on this variable, and not on others. It may be 
because OA is a more diffi cult task than DA (as suggested 
by the greater number of trials to criterion across all groups 
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on OA), and that instruction in both rules was necessary to 
reduce the number of nonperseverative errors for the KS 
group, whereas instruction in either rule was helpful for 
the AL and NC groups. Again, this is consistent with the 
conclusion that the ability to induce both the Alternation and 
Correction Rules was the major determinant of performance 
in the KS group in this study.
Signifi cant Group effects were only seen on DA trials to 
criterion, but the magnitude of effect sizes indicates that sig-
nifi cant results would be predicted with larger sample sizes on 
all the other DA and OA measures. Indeed, before the group 
differences on age, education, and VIQ were considered in 
the analyses of covariance, GLM analyses of variance on the 
same data (with greater available degrees of freedom than in 
the ANCOVAs), indicated signifi cant group effects for DA 
nonperseverative errors, F(2, 21) = 5.10, p < .05, OA trials to 
criterion, F(2, 22) = 5.30, p < 0.05, and OA nonperseverative 
errors F(2, 22) = 9.68, p < 0.005. Results for perseverative 
errors in these ANOVAs were not signifi cant (all p’s > 0.05). 
Importantly for our understanding of KS patients, this group 
benefi ted from provision of the response rules, consistent 
with the hypothesis that performance on DA and OA is 
strongly related to rule knowledge.
The fact that the KS group benefi ted from rule provi-
sion, but still fared worse than the other two groups overall, 
suggests a number of possible interpretations. Firstly, the 
KS group was older, less educated, and had a lower average 
VIQ than the AL and NC groups, which may account for 
its poorer performance. Although age, education, and VIQ 
were not signifi cant in the analyses of covariance, this may 
be related to inadequacies in analysis of covariance in such a 
small sample. This is an unfortunate limitation of this study, 
but is diffi cult to overcome given the infrequency of KS in the 
population, and the demographic characteristics of the people 
who volunteered to participate in the research. However, this 
limitation in matching the three groups does not affect the 
primary aim of the study, which was to examine the effects of 
rule provision on DA and OA performance in KS and elderly 
AL and NC groups. Despite the small sample size, separate 
analyses of the KS group indicated the same pattern of results 
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for the effects of rule provision on performance as the analyses 
involving all three groups.
A second interpretation of the group differences is that 
they may due to cognitive impairment in the KS group, and 
may not be related to the demographic variables mentioned 
above. This latter possibility is consistent with research that 
found no infl uence of age or education on error scores on 
tests of set-shifting and rule induction in elderly individuals 
(Lowe and Reynolds 1999). Therefore, despite differences in 
demographic and VIQ variables, the KS group may have been 
impaired relative to the AL and NC groups in rule induction 
abilities, or may have had diffi culty with the complexity and 
mnemonic demands of the tasks, even when either one of the 
response rules was provided. Defi cits of rule detection (Noël 
et al 2001), response inhibition/mental shifting (eg, Noël 
et al 2001; Hildebrandt et al 2004), and in the manipulation of 
information stored in working memory (eg, Noël et al 2001) 
are known defi cits in alcoholics with and without Korsakoff’s 
syndrome (Oscar-Berman 2000).
Overall, these data extend our previous finding 
(Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998) that the ability to induce 
the Alternation and Correction Rules is a major component of 
successful performance on OA: The results apply to amnesic 
and nonamnesic patients alike. The signifi cant effects of rule 
provision on the number of trials to criterion suggests that this 
measure directly refl ects the ability to induce the response 
rules. From inspecting the trials to criterion and nonperse-
verative error scores for the AL and NC groups, it is clear 
that DA is an easier task than OA, and that the Alternation 
Rule is easier to induce in DA than in OA. During post-test 
debriefi ng, many of the AL and NC participants who failed 
OA said they had not taken notice of the objects when try-
ing to fi nd the reward. Several spoke of trying a number of 
complex hypotheses regarding the reward schedule, and they 
were surprised to hear it was a simple alternation between 
objects.
Our results suggest some hypotheses as to why OA 
appears to be more sensitive to abnormal perseverative 
responding than DA (Freedman 1990, 1994; Freedman et al 
1998). The fact that neurologically intact individuals tend to 
perseverate on OA when unaware of the response rule in both 
the current study and our previous research (Bardenhagen 
and Bowden 1998) suggests that the task parameters elicit 
perseverative errors, which makes it more sensitive to abnor-
mal perseverative responding (Freedman 1990, 1994; Freed-
man et al 1998). OA may be more sensitive to paradigmatic 
perseveration than DA because participants have to learn 
to focus on the objects and disregard the random spatial 
positions of the rewards. DA, in contrast, involves a simple 
left-right alternation of identical stimulus plaques.
In our research, instruction in the Alternation Rule 
appeared to have a greater effect on performance than instruc-
tion in the Correction Rule in both tasks, possibly because 
the Correction Rule is easier to induce. All the Correction 
Rule requires is choice of the other object or side after an 
incorrect response. In contrast, mastery of the Alternation 
Rule requires consistent switching between objects or sides 
after correct responses. It is possible that the Correction Rule 
may be more diffi cult to induce in OA than DA, as there is 
only the issue of side to consider in DA, while OA has the 
additional variable of Object to consider. For both tasks, 
there is no indication that the trial after an error is any dif-
ferent from other trials. Many participants indicated that if 
the reward was not on one side the last time, they assumed it 
must be there the next time. Perseverative errors might easily 
arise from this faulty assumption, and even healthy controls 
make perseverative errors when not provided with the task 
rules. While total errors and perseverative errors usually are 
considered a sign of defective response inhibition arising 
from frontal lobe damage in the literature on DA and OA, the 
results of this study, and our previous research (Bardenhagen 
and Bowden 1998), indicate that errors on DA and OA may 
refl ect lack of knowledge of task rules, or the inability to 
induce them, consistent with Hauser’s (1999) concept of 
paradigmatic perseveration. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that abnormal perseveration may arise from frontal as well 
as nonfrontal lesions (Sandson and Albert 1984).
The fi ndings of this study provide clear support for the 
hypothesis that poor performance on DA and OA can arise 
from lack of knowledge of the task rules. Still, as was the case 
in our earlier research, rule provision does not ensure perfect 
performance, suggesting that rule knowledge is not the only 
factor contributing to success on DA and OA (Bardenhagen 
and Bowden 1998; Hauser 1999). Nonetheless, rule provi-
sion resulted in improved performance for all participants, 
including those with KS. Similar fi ndings may be expected 
with different rule induction tasks, such as the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST), and the Halstead Category Test 
(eg, Lezak 1995). Indeed, WCST improvements have been 
reported in patients with schizophrenia, who were given 
simple remediative techniques such as the instruction to 
verbalize the sorting category with each response, or who 
were provided with feedback on verbalized responses (Nisbet 
et al 1996; Stratta et al 1997).
From the results of the present study and research 
reviewed to date, we can postulate that errors on rule 
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induction tasks may arise from a number of causes, including 
the following: a lack of understanding of the task; inability 
to deduce the rules of a task; poor memory for the task’s 
rules; forgetting the previous response; and failure to inhibit 
incorrect responses (Bardenhagen and Bowden 1998). Simi-
larly, it can be argued that successful performance requires 
the ability to generate and evaluate competing hypotheses; 
to test, discard, and remember unsuccessful strategies; and 
to persevere until a successful strategy is found. These com-
ponents of performance are thought to involve prefrontal 
working memory (eg, Goldman-Rakic 1991; Freedman et 
al 1998), and possibly limbic associational memory abilities 
(Jernigan et al 1991; Olton et al 1992). The design of rule 
induction tasks ensures that they will elicit perseverative 
errors even in healthy control participants. As a result, we 
would argue that until other causes for repetitive errors are 
excluded, perseverative errors on rule induction tasks cannot 
be attributed to defective response inhibition alone.
The results of the present study support previous fi nd-
ings of the sensitivity of DA and OA tasks to cognitive 
impairment in individuals with Alcohol-Induced Persisting 
Amnestic Disorder (Oscar-Berman et al 1982; Dirksen et al 
2006). While the poor performance of the KS group on 
these tasks would conventionally be attributed to prefrontal 
dysfunction, the DA impairments found here and reported 
previously (Oscar-Berman et al 1982) may also be a sign of 
their well-known diencephalic neuropathology (Victor et al 
1989), particularly in light of the sensitivity of DA to lim-
bic and diencephalic lesions in nonhuman animals (Orbach 
et al 1960; Waxler and Rosvold 1970; Mahut 1971; Irle and 
Markowitsch, 1982; Isseroff et al 1982; Winocur 1985). 
Given evidence of diffuse cerebral involvement, including 
limbic, diencephalic, and prefrontal cortical changes, in 
Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (Bengochea and Gonzalo 
1990; Jernigan et al 1991; Harper et al 1995), and the recent 
PET evidence of frontal as well as nonfrontal activation dur-
ing DA and OA performance (Zald et al 2002, 2005), it may 
be most appropriate to conclude that the impairments on these 
tasks by KS patients (Oscar-Berman et al 1982; Dirksen et al 
2006) is related to widespread cerebral pathology.
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